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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We first provide a brief review of the literature in Section 2.
Section 3 studies the optimal seeding when the seller has full control over the allocation outcome of the seeding process. In Section 4, we extend the analysis to the case where the seller has only limited control over the allocation outcome of the seeding process. Section 5 compares seller profit, consumer surplus and social welfare under different models. Section 6 concludes.
Literature Review
We use Table 1 to summarize related literature on seeding and sampling. Our review is by no means exhaustive.
Rather we intend to use Table 1 to highlight some gaps in the literature and justify our intended contributions.
As shown in Table 1 , there is a small but growing body of literature on seeding. A software firm may give away the fully functional new product to a fraction of the potential customer base in order to simply catalyze the adoption process (Jiang and Sarkar 2009) . Under dynamic pricing, seeding is optimal only for limited situations but does not appear to be optimal when there is a premature downturn/stalling in sales (Lehmann and Esteban-Bravo 2006) . Most of the literature follows the classic Bass diffusion model (Bass 1969) , which is at the macro level instead of the individual level as we do. In a different context (social networks), the role of seeding has recently been explored via simulation (Aral et al. 2011; Galeotti and Goyal 2009) . In a two-period setting under word-ofmouth effects, Niculescu and Wu (2011) find that uniform seeding is always dominated by either time-limited freemium models (give away the product to the entire customer base in the first period and charge afterwards) or conventional for-fee models.
Product sampling and free demonstration are also widely used as methods to boost adoption. Product sampling involves giving away samples to customers in order to update their priors on the product value. Jain et al. (1995) study the optimal number of free samples based on the classic Bass model. Heiman and Muller (1996) extend this study by controlling the sampling time. Bawa and Shoemaker (2004) empirically test impacts of sampling and document that free samples can produce measurable long-term effects on sales. Cheng and Tang (2010) compare the free-trial and versioning strategies and find that the strength of network effects plays a critical role. Cheng and Liu (2010) extend the model to include time-sensitive network effects and derive conditions under which a time-limited model may be preferred.
To the best of our knowledge, the extant literature has not explored in depth how the seller should control the adoption process under various seeding scenarios. In this study, we attempt to fill this gap by focusing on the path of adoption, taking into account the individual-level consumer adoption decision as well as the seller's degree of control over the outcome of the seeding process.
Seeding with Full Control
In this section, we present our general model. We assume the seller has full information about the consumers.
Initially, we assume the seller has full control over the allocation of the seeds by being able to pick and choose which customer to seed. Essentially, we consider price discrimination in the presence of network effects. We begin 4 with several very simple examples to highlight key ideas in our model. Next, we then characterize seller's optimal strategies. We then extend our analysis to consider general utility function, general distribution function, and additive form of network effects.
1. The Model Setup
We consider a software market with a monopolistic seller and a mass of potential customers. The total number of the customers is .
K Following the standard literature, customer type  is assumed to be uniformly distributed on [0, 1] . Denote [0, 1]   as the current fraction of customers who have already adopted the product, then customer  's willingness-to-pay (WTP) is ( , ) .
uK     
The above multiplicative setting captures network effects in that early adopters would influence the WTP of late adopters. Later on, we extend our analysis to consider general utility function, distribution function and additive form of network effects. Customers are assumed not to be able to collude and arbitrage cannot occur among customers. We further assume that they are myopic in the sense that a potential customer adopts as soon as her updated WTP based on current installed base exceeds the price. If more than one customer's WTP exceeds the price at the same time, we break the tie by assuming that the customer with the higher type adopts first.
The seller wishes to divide the entire market into n disjoint segments i throughout the rest of the paper, we use "segment" and "interval" interchangeably. We assume throughout this section that the seller has full information over customer type and their WTP. We consider several scenarios corresponding to seller's degree of control over the seeding process (full, limited, or no control) and the capability to observe the seeding outcome.
We assume the seller can also control the sequence of releasing the product by segments. 
For each customer, network effects manifest within and across intervals as each potential customer's WTP is driven by the total number of existing adopters. Following the literature on software adoption (e.g., Niculescu and Wu 2011), we assume that the software development cost is sunk and marginal reproduction and distribution costs are negligible. We are interested in the optimal structure formation (seeding, adoption sequencing, and pricing) of a software consumer network, and its impact on seller profit, consumer surplus, and social welfare.
Discrete Examples 6
For simplicity, we will use a few discrete customer type examples to illustrate our key ideas and intended insights. Our purpose is to show that seeding and sequencing matter in consumer network formation and business performance. These examples are based on a popular MBA class network game originally developed by Prof. First let us consider the case that no customer is seeded and only one price can be charged for all customers.
We show that the optimal pricing is to * 5, p  as other pricing strategies either leave money on the table or stall the adoption process prematurely (thus suboptimal). The adoption sequence associated with optimal pricing follows the sequence of F, E, D, C, B, and finally to the last paying customer, A. We depict this adoption sequence in Figure 1 , in which each block/node represents a customer identified in the middle cell. The top cell records the price charged to customer i and the bottom cell is her current WTP which increases as the number of adopters grows. Solid lines connect adopters that form the customer network, while dotted lines indicate network effects of existing adopters to potential new adopters. Note that consumers B to F all enjoy net surplus at the end of this adoption process due to the continuous growth of the installed base post their adoption. Such benefit may not be present at the time of their adoptions, case of point is customer E, whose net surplus is zero (5 -5 = 0) when she first adopted. Next, we consider the case that no customer is seeded but the seller can conduct perfect price discrimination. It can be shown that the optimal strategy is penetration pricing by charging * p (A, B, C, D, E, F) = (1, 2, 6, 12, 20, 30) In the third example, we allow seeding and assume customers A, B, and C are seeded. Then customer F's WTP is updated from the initial value of 6 to 18 = 3*6 due to three existing adopters (seeded customers A, B, and C).
If the price is 18, F adopts as this price equals F's current WTP. E follows suit after F adopts, as E's WTP is updated from the initial value of 5 to be 4*5=20, which exceeds the price. As proved in the next section, such a seeding and sequencing strategy is optimal if the seller wishes to charge only one positive price. Comparing with Figure 1 and 2, we can see that, when only one price can be charged, prices. We will show that the optimal seeding and sequencing strategy is as follows. The seller should balance to the extent possible the size of the three segments (free, low price, and high price).
Figure 4. Two Prices, Full Seeding Control
In particular, in this example, each segment should have two customers. The seeds should go to the lower end of the market {A, B}. The seller then opens the low price segment {C, D} by charging a price that is equal to D's WTP, which is 2*4 = 8. Within the segment, C's WTP becomes 3*3 = 9 immediately after D adopts, so C would also adopt. Finally, the seller opens the high price segment {E, F}, by charging a price that is equal to the WTP of the highest type customer (F), which is 4*6 = 24. E adopts after F, as 5*5 = 25 > 24. Notice that this strategy remains socially optimal. However, by adding one more segment, the seller is able to profit more and give away fewer.
What if, for some reasons, the seller is unable to fully control the seeding process? Assume the seller wishes to seed three customers and charge one price to the rest. Suppose that a random draw allocates the seeds to customers {A, C, E}and the seller observes this outcome. It is straightforward to see that the optimal price is 16, yielding adoption of F, followed by D but B would not adopt (as 5*2 = 10 < 16). As depicted in Figure 3 , and compared with 
Optimal Solution to Basic Model with Full Seeding Control
We first solve the seller's problem with the assumption that the seller can fully control the seeding allocation process. Lemma 1 characterizes the necessary conditions for optimality to the seller's problem (as defined earlier). It follows immediately from Lemma 1 that finding the optimal seeding strategy *  is equivalent to finding the optimal seeding mass *  at the beginning of the lowest segment. Figure 6 illustrates the optimal adoption sequence.
Lemma 1 (Necessary conditions for optimality
The horizontal axis depicts the adoption sequence and y-axis refers to customer's initial WTP. Segment ( , ]
 with price * 2 . p Within each segment, the adoption goes from high to low customer type. After everyone in the segment has adopted, next segment will be opened, so on and so forth. Given Lemma 1, Proposition 1 gives the optimal strategy.
Proposition 1 (n-price optimal strategies). The seller's optimal strategies are the following: ( 1) , 2,..., .
Proposition 1 provides several insights on the structure of the seller's problem. First, as expected, seller's profit increases as the number of segments increases, and is bounded by 2 3 K . Second, when the seller can charge only one single price, percentage of seeded market is the largest. In this case, optimal seeding ratio, price, and profit are given
Extension: General Utility Function
In this section, we consider a more general form of utility function
continuous, increasing, and second order differentiable. Assume further (0) 0, (1) 1. ww  To focus on adoption sequencing, we restrict our analysis to the case when the seller charges every paying customer a single price (i.e., 1 n  ). It is straightforward to verify that Lemma 1 holds in this generalized utility case. Lemma 2 below characterizes the optimal seeding and pricing strategy: 
Proposition 2 extends our findings under the basic model where the utility function is linear to the more general non-linear case. Under a concave utility function, the optimal strategy remains identical as in the basic model. This is due to the fact that optimal pricing remains the same and concavity ensures the remaining two constraints are satisfied, because
Note that the optimal seeding ratio is larger than 1 2 , in which case the seller gives away free products to the majority of the market in order to capture the amplified WTP of a few high type customers through network effects.
For example, if 10 () w   , it can be shown that the optimal seeding ratio is * 10 11   , meaning the seller seeds 10 customers in order to harvest one paying customer. This free/fee ratio is referred in practice as the freemium rate, and some software entrepreneurs are advocating a "good" freemium rate is around 10, but our model suggests that the optimal freemium rate depends on the form of the consumer's utility function. 
Extension: General Distribution Function
The optimal solution to the seller's problem is subject to the customer type distribution function. We use Figure 7 below to show numerically how customer distribution affects WTP functions, and, implicitly, the pricing strategies. For each type, the figure depictes the WTP function precisely at the adoption time when all the seeds have been allocated and higher type customers have adopted. Customers in Panel (a) follow a uniform distribution and customers in Panel (b) follow a truncated normal distribution over [0, 1] . From panel (a), it is straightforward to see that the optimal price is 50 (as we proved in Proposition 1).
However, under the truncated normal distribution, as Panel (b) indicates, the WTP function does not reach the minimum at boundaries. If the price is set at 50, the adoption sequence would have stalled after the first paying customer adopts. In this case, the solution given by Proposition 1 is no longer optimal. We need to use Lemma 3 to find the optimal pricing strategy. In Panel (b) of Figure 5 , the minimum is approximately 47.645<50, which is reached at customer type around 0.83. Hence, compared with the optimal strategy under the uniform distribution, the seller needs to either decrease the price or increase the number of seeds. Computed numerically, the optimal solution is This example illustrates how customer distribution affects the optimal strategies. Essentially, when the minimum WTP (at adoption time) is not reached at the boundaries, Lemma 3 is needed to find the optimal price.
Otherwise, there would be customers leftover without the product, which is suboptimal under full visibility due to Lemma 1.
Extension: Additive Form of Network Effects
So far, we have been using the multiplicative form to characterize the network effects. In this subsection, we extend our model to an additive form of network effects (e.g. Conner 1995; Jing 2007; Cheng and Tang 2010) following the standard linear form:
( , ) ,
where  characterizes the strength of the network effects and u represents the current WTP . Consider the case where the type distribution is uniform. It can be verified that Lemma 1 still holds (see proof of Proposition 3 in the appendix). The following result characterizes the optimal firm strategies in this setting.
Proposition 3 (n-price optimal strategies). The seller's optimal strategies are the following:
(a) (Optimal Seeding *  ) The optimal seeding strategy is
0, 1
/ , 1
Comparing Propositions 1 and 3, we can see that the optimal market segmentation structure is similar under our two forms of network effects. The only difference is the optimal seeding ratio. Under the multiplicative setting, the market is equally segmented and the mass of seeded customers is equal to the mass of paying customers in intervals 2 to n . In contrast, under additive setting, the mass of seeded customers is smaller than the mass of customers in any other segment. Specifically, in the case of no price discrimination when 1 n  , the ratio of seeded customers is
which is always smaller than 1/ 2, the optimal seeding ratio under the multiplicative setting. This can be explained by the structure of network effects. Under the additive form of network effects, seeded customers contribute the same amount of network effects to other potential buyers. Under the multiplicative form of network effects, however, the network effects are larger for the potential buyers with higher types. In the latter case, the seller should seed more customers to profit more from the high-end customers.
We also observe that the seeding fraction   This indicates that the additional value created by seeding is smaller than the profit the seller can obtain by charging the seeded customers.
Because the optimal market structure is similar under both forms of network effects, we will use the multiplicative form in the rest of the paper.
Seeding with Limited Control
So far we have assumed that the seller has full controllability over the seeding process. We now extend the analysis to the case where the seller cannot fully control the seeding outcome. We consider two sub-cases: (1).
although the seller cannot fully control seeding (limited controllability), he is able to observe the seeding outcome (full visibility); (2) the seller can neither fully control seeding (limited controllability) nor observe the seeding outcome (limited visibility). We will discuss these two sub-cases respectively. In the case of limited controllability but with full visibility, we consider two potential scenarios: the worst seeding case (when all the seeds go to the highest valuation customers) and the uniform case (when the seeds are uniformly distributed among all customers).
In the case of limited controllability and limited visibility, we identify conditions for an optimal pricing strategy that is independent of the seeding outcome.
For simplicity, we restrict our analysis to the case when WTP is linear such that ( ) , w   the consumer type distribution is uniform, and there is no price discrimination ( 1 n  ).
Worst Seeding Case
The worst case occurs when all the seeds go to the high end of the market. In this case, let us denote the seller's optimal strategy by ( , ), 
.
The mass of paying customers is (1 
Uniform Seeding Case
The second limited control scenario we consider is uniform seeding where the seeds are uniformly distributed among all customers. Assume the seeding ratio is 
Note that the seller's profit decreases from full control, to uniform seeding, and to worst seeding, which highlights the importance of controllability of the seeding process, from the seller's perspective.
Random Seeding with Limited Control
In this section, we discuss the case where the seller can neither fully control seeding nor observe the seeding outcome.
Instead of jointly optimizing on both the number of seeds and price, we introduce an optimal pricing strategy which is subject to the seller's controllability over the allocation of the seeds. We will show that our optimal pricing strategy is not affected by the seeding outcome. This "trick" could dramatically simplify the seller's decision making process when he faces randomness in seeding.
When seeds are not controllable, we assume that all the seeds go to countably many intervals on 
Information Acquisition
When the seller cannot observe the seeding outcome, an alternative is to pay for the information on customers' WTP (e.g., hire a target advertising company or purchase customer data from a third party). We consider this case in this section. Proposition 5 provides useful guidelines that can help the seller choose between different strategies. It formalizes the intuition that information acquisition outperforms random seeding when the information acquisition cost is small. However, when this cost is moderate (see case c in Proposition 5), either one can be optimal depending on the randomness in the seeding outcome.
Social Welfare Analysis
In this section, we compare the social welfare implications of four models: (1) n-price with optimal seeding, (2) one price with optimal seeding, (3) one price with uniform seeding, and (4) one price with worst seeding. Table 2 summarizes the seller's profit, consumers' surplus, and social welfare corresponding to each model. Note that consumer surplus and social welfare are both computed after the entire adoption process has been completed, as we show earlier on in our discrete case examples. Table 2 , optimal seeding leads to social welfare maximization regardless of how the market is segmented (however, the seller makes more profit by increasing segments). The social welfare decreases when the seller loses control over the seeding process. Interestingly, the case of worst seeding has a higher social welfare than the case of uniform seeding, because the former is associated with a lower optimal price (than the latter), thus attracting more paying customers. In other words, more customers are left unserved in the case of uniform seeding.
Consumer surplus is the other side of the same coin. The case of worst seeding offers consumers a higher surplus, due to the increase in the social welfare and decrease in seller's profit. Compared with the case of uniform seeding, worse seeding covers a larger portion of the market at a lower price.
Finally, it is worth noting where the consumer surplus is coming from. Under our setting, consumers are myopic and they adopt the software as soon as their WTP exceeds the price charged to them. However, they ultimately enjoy additional surplus as the installed base grows over time.
Conclusion
Understanding the process of software adoption is of paramount importance to software start-ups, who are increasingly embracing the seeding strategy to jumpstart adoption and boost the willingness-to-pay of potential paying customers via network effects. We study the seller's optimal seeding, sequencing, and pricing strategies in the presence of network effects. We demonstrate the importance of sequencing as well as controllability over the seeding process to seller's profit, consumer surplus, and social welfare.
With both multiplicative and additive forms of network effects, we find that under multiple pricing and full control of the seeding process, it is optimal to seed only the lower half of the lowest valuation segment and then charge nonzero prices to every other customer. The optimal sequence of opening the segments follows an ascending order of customer types, while within each segment, paying customers adopt in descending order of their types. Social welfare is maximized under optimal seeding but decreases when the seller loses control over the seeding process.
Under single pricing and limited seeding control, worst case seeding has a higher social welfare and consumer surplus than uniform seeding, because the former covers a larger market at a lower price. In the case of random seeding with limited control, we identify an optimal strategy and conditions under which the optimal price is not 20 affected by the randomness of seeding. The model in this paper provides a new perspective to study the adoption path and to enhance our understanding of software adoption dynamics. Specifically, we focus on how to shape the software adoption process via seeding in a consumer network. Our framework and findings may help software vendors to efficiently and effectively design their marketing strategies. 
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1.
(a). (i)
We show that under optimality, the market is fully covered. We do so in two steps.
First, we show that in each segment, the seller should complete seeding before start selling. Suppose otherwise:
after adoption by a set of paying customers, the seller seeds a set of non-buying customers. Then seeding the same set of non-buying customers before selling strictly increases the WTP of each and every customer in the same set of paying customers. The seller thus can make a higher profit by charging a higher price without shrinking the installed base of paying customers.
Second, we prove by contradiction that, the market is fully covered under optimality. However, seeding these non-buying customers before charging will only increase WTP of the rest customers in this segment and all customers in subsequent segments. Thus the seller can raise the price by
for this segment without shrinking the installed base of paying customers, thus making a strictly higher profit. This contradicts the optimality of the original strategy.
(ii). We show that under optimality, all segments contain only paying customers except for the first one, which contains both seeded and paying customers.
We first show that in each segment, seeding the low end is optimal (where the mass of seeding could be zero, i.e., no seeding is a special case of seeding). 
This means that WTP of all paying customers in 11 ( , ] kk   is increasing under the candidate strategy. Thus the seller makes a higher profit using the candidate strategy. This contradicts the optimality of the original strategy. 
We denote the optimal price for each segment as i p . Note that at any moment along the adoption process, the current fraction of adopters from the intervals in A is no greater than . 
which implies that the total profit under the candidate strategy is non-decreasing. Therefore under the optimal strategy, 0 j   for 2, 3,..., jn  and all seeds go to interval 1. This completes the proof of (a).
(b). We prove part (b) by induction.
Step (i): From (a), we know that segment 1 is opened first, i.e.,
Step ( 
